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ABSTRACT
Recent events, such as the 2008 food price crisis, have focussed global attention on the agriculture and
food sectors. In particular, many countries have become increasingly concerned with the issue of ensuring
the security of their food supply and one key element of this is who has power within the food supply
chain. Through examining three dimensions of power – Economic, Political, and Natural Resources – this
paper explores where power currently lies in world agriculture and how this might change in the future.
Whilst recognising that power is a somewhat abstract concept, through a process of deriving potential
indicators, a picture of the distribution of power is drawn. These indicators were also used to develop a
simple ‘global power index’. The power index indicates that the US and the EU dominate world
agriculture in terms of economics and politics, but are potentially vulnerable in terms of their possession
of natural resources. On the other hand, the emerging economies have lower political and corporate
power, but seem better placed in terms of natural resources. The paper concludes by discussing the
implications of these findings for the main food producing regions.
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1. Introduction
The 2008 food price crisis has focussed global attention
on the agriculture and food sectors. In particular, many
countries have become increasingly concerned with the
issue of ensuring the security of food supply and one key
element of this is who has control or power within the
food supply chain. In addition, a number of other recent
developments in the agriculture and food sectors and
the wider economy make consideration of the issue of
‘power’ particularly timely.
First, the perception that global power is shifting
eastwards has attracted considerable interest (Nye,
2011; Whalley, 2009). For example, the economies of
the US and many European countries have continued to
decline in recent years, whilst China’s economy has
continued to grow, even during the recent economic
turmoil. This has sparked speculation as to whether or
not the recent recession is a sign of the decline of US and
European power in the world (Nye, 2011). This
speculation raises the interesting question as to whether
this decline in western economic power in general is also
evident in the agricultural sector.
Second, as the food system has become more globally
integrated, there have been major changes in the way
trade is conducted between nations. Closed-door
policies to protect farmers from outside competition
are disappearing as is the operation of state trading.
Rather, due to the influence of globalisation - increased
transnational migration, movement of assets and capital
from one country or region to another – agricultural
markets are prone to be more open than ever before.
This evolution has given rise to dramatic changes in the
global agri-food system, with once food-deficit countries
appearing as powerful trade entities, giving rise to
increased competition and power struggles in the
international arena.
Third, as the agricultural system has become increas-
ingly global it has also become highly commercialised
and concentrated. For example, the fact that a few large
transnational corporations (TNCs) handle the vast
majority of the grain traded internationally is often cited
as an example of both the globalisation and concentration
of the agriculture sector (Hendrickson, et al., 2008). In
addition, rapidly evolving global supermarkets are pene-
trating almost every corner of the globe. The emergence of
these corporate actors in the food system has created a
major reorientation in the locus of power, arguably, even
further away from farmers (Murphy, 2006).
Fourth, a significant characteristic of the global agri-
food system is the reliance on non-renewable natural
resources, such as minerals and fossil fuels. Since these
resources are scarce they often lead to conflicts and
tensions between nation states. These tensions and
struggles are likely to be exacerbated in the coming
decades due to the impact of climate change. Therefore,
natural resource endowments will become an increasing
source of power in global agriculture.
The purpose of this work, therefore, is to use available
evidence to improve our understanding of the above
issues in global agriculture. More specifically, this study
attempts to assess who currently has power in global
agriculture, how this may change in the future and what
this might mean for those involved in the sector.
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In the following sections we elaborate on the concept
of power, discuss the indicators and methods used in
assessing power, present the results of our analysis, and
finally draw some conclusions as to the implications for
those involved in the agricultural sector.
2. Conceptual Framework and Research
Methods
At the outset it is important to note that there is no
single or unified definition of the term ‘power’.
However, three possible dimensions of power, eco-
nomic, political and power over natural resources form
the basis of this paper.
Economic power can be defined as the ability of an
actor to compel, persuade, or control the behaviour of
other actors through the deliberate and politically
motivated use of economic assets (Frost, 2009;
Whalley, 2009). At an international level, exercise of
this type of power manifests itself in the denial of
market access, withdrawal of investments, the imposi-
tion of trade embargoes or the control of exports. For
corporate businesses, economic power may arise due to
the existence of highly concentrated sectors and
manifest itself in the ability to influence price and
reduce the competition (Murphy, 2008).
Political power (often closely related to economic
power) is the ability of actors to coerce, control or
persuade others by using political means. The most
obvious source of such power is political legitimacy
acquired through electoral processes coupled with
holding positions in key decision making bodies. For
countries and regions this power may be obtained
through positions on such bodies as the United Nations,
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World
Trade Organisation, etc. (The Economist, undated).
Political power of the TNCs, on the other hand, is
manifested through their influence on public policy
processes (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009).
Whilst economic and political dimensions of power
are often discussed in the literature, the power resulting
from the possession of natural resources is less well
documented. However, the industrial scale and nature
of agriculture means it relies heavily on the use of
natural resources, such as water, minerals and fossil
fuel. As many of these resources are scarce and non-
renewable, those in control of these resources are likely
to be in a much stronger position to exert power. By the
same token, those who have scarcity in these resources
are likely to be vulnerable to outside control (Fanzul,
2006; Hendrickson et al., 2008).
In order to assess these three dimensions of power a
number of indicators were developed and these are
highlighted in Table 1, along with the sources of data.
As highlighted in the table, three indicators provide
the basis of our analysis of economic power. These are
agricultural gross value added (GVA), the size of
international trade, and the magnitude of corporate
concentration. The first indicator shows the size of the
agricultural economy and the second implies that actors
possessing wealth and market strength are likely to be in
a position to influence others or prevent others from
influencing them.2
The third indicator is based on the assumption that
countries that are home to a larger number of TNCs are
better placed to exercise power over the countries that
have a weaker corporate base. We are aware that this
might be contested, but believe that corporations are
vital for understanding a country’s economic power,
because it is the TNCs rather than the nation states
themselves that trade the bulk of agricultural commod-
ities (Fanzul, 2006). For example, in the year 2000,
corporations were identified as being responsible for
Table 1: Indicators and data sources used to assess power in this research
Dimensions Indicators Key data sources
Economic Agricultural Gross Value Added (GVA) World Bank (http.) database




FAOSTAT (TradeStat), FAO Statistical Yearbook
(2010), USAID Foreign Agricultural Services
database, OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook
2011–2020 database
Dominant TNCs headquartered in the country
and their income and assets
N Aggregate picture
N Commodity-specific pictures
UNCTAD (2009) data, Financial Times (FT) Global
500 data
Political Countries: Financial contribution and power
within the WTO
WTO reports; other publications
Countries: Financial contribution and voting
power within the World Bank
World Bank reports; other publications
TNCs: Political lobbying and election campaign
financing expenditures
Centre for Responsive Politics (2011) database
Natural Resources Land (total land and arable land) World Bank database; FAO Statistical Yearbook (2010)
Water (total, renewable) FAO AquaStat
Minerals (mine reserves, production,
consumption and depletion time of
phosphate and potassium)
US Geological Survey (2011) data
Energy (reserves, consumption and depletion of
crude oil and natural gas)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 2010) database
2The choice of agricultural based indicators to reflect economic power reflects the focus
of this paper on power within agriculture, but it is acknowledged that this may have
limitations. For example, it can be argued that countries with stronger levels of total
economic power have dominated the agricultural trade agenda in the past. Conversely, it
is of course possible that countries with strong agricultural sectors could have low overall
economic power which might limit their ability to exert power over trade.
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two-thirds of global trade with their worldwide sales
quadrupling from US$3 trillion3 in 1980 to US$14
trillion in 2000 (Action Aid, undated). Although TNCs,
by definition, operate in multiple countries and hence do
not belong to any specific country, their power is usually
located in the headquarters of their home country. In
this study, TNCs are analysed in terms of their location,
income, and market share.
As outlined earlier, political power is exercised
through political legitimacy, position, authority and
governance rules. Since these concepts underpinning
political power are not easily quantifiable, examples and
narratives are used as evidence of political power. We
have analysed two cases that are illustrative of the
political power of nation states in world agriculture –
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the World
Bank. Whilst focussing on these organisations we
recognise that a number of other international institu-
tions – such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the United Nations (UN) – are also important for
understanding the exercise of political power. The
political power of TNCs was assessed based on their
lobbying and political campaign financing expenditures
(Clapp & Fuchs, 2009).
In terms of the possession of natural resources as a
source of power we have analysed four aspects
representing the key demands of agriculture namely:
land, water, agricultural minerals, and energy. The
current distribution of these resources between countries
and regions and how such factors as resource depletion
may alter this distribution in the future are considered.
3. Results
Economic Power
Historically the USA and EU274 have had the largest
agricultural economies measured by value of agricul-
tural Gross Value Added (GVA). However, the
emergence of the Chinese and Indian farm economies
has been significant, with China’s agricultural GVA
increasing six fold between 1988 and 2008 and that of
India by 2.4%. In comparison, during the same period,
the growth in GVA has only been 1.6% and 1.7% in the
EU27 and USA respectively. Figure 1 reveals the largest
agricultural economies in 2008.
China’s agricultural GVA was US$485 billion,
dwarfing that of the next largest farm economies of
the EU27 (US$266 billion), India (US$214 billion) and
USA (US$176 billion). However, the size of the
agricultural sector, whilst highlighting the scale of
agriculture and potential importance to these countries,
does tell us relatively little about who has power,
3 In early October 2012 US$1 was approximately equivalent to £0.62 and J0.77
(www.xe.com).
Figure 1: Agricultural GVA, 2008
4 It should be noted that generally within this study the figures for the EU27 are presented
as if it is a single entity, whereas this is not the case with other trade agreements such as
NAFTA, ASEAN etc. In part this differentiation is undertaken due to the greater level of
integration (trade, legislative, monetary and economic) within the EU compared with many
of the other agreements. This is not to downplay the importance of these trade
agreements.
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because it is through interactions between countries (for
example trade) that power manifests itself.
It is also important to recognise that whilst as a single
entity the EU27 may compete with the US and China in
terms of scale, the power dynamic is likely to be very
different. The existence of a diversity of interests in such
a union may weaken the negotiating position in
comparison to a single country such as the US. For
example, within the EU, net importing and net
exporting countries may have diverging views as to
policy and compromises will inevitably occur.
International Agricultural Trade: Aggregate imports and
exports
When examining trade patterns in agriculture it is
pertinent to remember that historically agricultural
trade has been heavily distorted by a range of factors
including domestic agricultural policy, import protec-
tion and export subsidies. Trade patterns therefore
reflect the influence of these factors. However, as ‘old
style’ agricultural protection is declining it is useful to
examine how trade patterns are evolving and what this
means for the balance of power in agriculture.
According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation
(FAO), from 1999 to 2008, annual trade (imports and
exports) of agricultural products in the world averaged
over US$600 billion. This trade was highly concen-
trated, with 20 countries accounting for 70% of world
imports and 78% of exports. The EU27 (particularly the
EU9 countries) played a dominant role in this trade,
accounting for 44% and 46% of the total global imports
and exports, respectively. However, intra EU27 trade
accounted for 75% of total EU27 exports and 73% of
imports over the decade, reiterating the significant
importance of the EU’s internal market to total global
agricultural trade.
When intra-EU trade is excluded (Figure 2) the USA
and EU27 can be seen to dominate world agricultural
trade. Between 2006 and 2008 the EU27 and USA each
accounted for just over 16% of total exports (average of
$583 billion per annum) with Brazil (7.6%) and
Australia and New Zealand (6.17%) the next largest
exporters. Among the BRICS coalition only Brazil and
China (4.2%) were significant exporters with the other
three countries– India, Russia and South Africa –
having minimal exports.
The EU27 (17%) was the dominant importer of
agricultural produce globally, followed by the USA
(12.8%), China (8.4%), Japan (7.7%) and the African
continent (7.6%). It should be noted that not all
commodities that are imported into a country are for
use in the country as a proportion will be re-exported,
particularly with some added value. It is noteworthy
that in Asia and the Middle East only five countries had
large import demands; China, Japan, South Korea,
Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, whereas none of the Latin
American countries were in the top 20 importers of
agricultural produce.
Comparing the export figures with imports, we can
see three broad groupings. First, the EU27, USA, and
China are both large exporters and importers. Second,
Japan and Russia are large importers, but not exporters.
Finally, Australia and New Zealand, Brazil, Argentina,
and India are major exporters, but not importers.
In terms of power, this does raise the question
whether an importing country has power because it is
wealthy enough to create the demand for goods? Or
Figure 2: Proportion of World Agricultural Trade (average 2006 to 2008)
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does power lies with the country that produces a surplus
and exports? We hypothesise that countries with both
import and export capacities (group one) are likely to be
more powerful than the countries in the other two
groups. Whilst Figure 2 provides a snapshot of the
overall agricultural trade situation, it is useful to
consider how trade patterns have evolved over time.
Figure 3 highlights how global net agricultural trade
(exports minus imports) has changed between the
averages of the 1997–99 and 2007–2009 periods. The
darker blue the country/region, the more the net trade
balance has improved (proportionally higher exports);
the redder the country/region is, the more the trade
balance has decreased (proportionately higher imports).
A picture of a New/Old world split seems to emerge with
North and South America and Australasia seeing
improvement in their net agricultural trade balances
whilst Europe’s have declined5 alongside the emerging
economies in Russia and China where there have been
significant increase in net agricultural imports. There
are a number of reasons for these changes, not least
significant shifts in agricultural policy within the EU-27
that altered net-production balances (EC, 2011).
International Agricultural Commodity Trade
As previously discussed countries/regions can be placed
into the categories of predominantly exporters, pre-
dominately importers or a combination of both.
Figure 4 shows selected countries that fall into these
categories, revealing their import and exports for key
agricultural commodities for the 2006 to 2008 period.6
This highlights the significant role that Brazil plays in
global exports of poultry meat, beef and to a lesser
extent pork, with Australia and New Zealand being
dominant exporters of beef and dairy products. For
these agricultural products Japan was highly reliant on
imports, as was Russia for beef, pork and poultry meat.
The USA and EU27 (excluding internal trade) played
significant roles in both supplying exports and import-
ing commodities for their internal market.
Changing trade patterns
Further insight into the nature of trade can be gained by
examining the destination of exports from the major
exporters and examining how these have changed over
time. It is clear that trade patterns reflect, amongst other
factors, location and historic relationships, but Regional
Trade Agreements and other factors have led to new
and evolving trade patterns emerging. Taking beef as an
example commodity, Figure 5 presents the change in
destinations of exports between the 1997–1999 and
2007–2009 periods.
The maps indicate that there have been significant
changes in the trade relationships in the beef sector.
Australia has taken the USA’s position as the most
important global supplier of beef between 1997–99 and
Figure 3: Change in Net Trade (exports minus imports) between average of 1997–99 and 2007–09
5 As the map is based on value of net trade, the scale of the change can be affected by
changes in prices between the two periods; however, it is still useful to highlight the
direction of change.
6Whilst noting that intra-EU trade is a very important component of international trade, the
following considers the EU27 as a single trading bloc and therefore will exclude intra EU
trade from the global figures.
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2007–09. Australia’s key beef export markets remain
relatively similar proportionately (although South
Korea rose from 5.4% of Australia’s beef exports in
1997–1999 to 14.9% in 2007–2009), although the value
of those exports more than doubled. This means that
Australia is reliant on three markets for 80% of its beef
exports, although all of them are covered by bilateral
trade agreements7 (although the recent US-Korea Free
Trade Agreement may impact on Australia’s beef
trade8).
Of particular note is the rapid emergence of Brazil as
the second most important exporter of beef in the 2007–
09 period (exports having grown 10 fold in the preceding
decade). In the late 1990’s Brazilian beef exports were
only about US$300, with three-quarters going to the
EU27. A decade later Brazil exports were over US$3.5
billion and its most important market is now Russia
(31% of its exports) with the EU27 now taking under 16
per cent. The USA’s beef exports have remained stable
in value (although have fallen in real terms) over the
period and links to the Japanese market have dimin-
ished (falling from 55% of all beef exports to 14%),
whilst links to regional partners, Canada and Mexico
have grown in importance, highlighting the significance
of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).
Corporate concentration
The structure of global business is continually changing
through a process of mergers, takeovers etc. and
therefore it is only ever possible to obtain a snapshot
of the situation. UNCTAD, however, provided a list of
the world’s top 150 agribusiness corporations which we
7 http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?rubrique127
8 http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article21118
Figure 4: Proportion of Global Trade in Selected Agricultural Commodities, by country / region (average 2006–2008)
Source: FAO
Power in Global Agriculture: Economics, Politics, and Natural Resources Alan Renwick et al.
ISSN 2047-3710 International Journal of Agricultural Management, Volume 2 Issue 1
36 ’ 2012 International Farm Management Association and Institute of Agricultural Management
have taken as the basis for our analysis (UNCTAD,
2009). According to this report, about 89% of these
corporations are located in just 20 countries. With 43
(over a quarter) of these companies the USA is home to
the largest number. In second position is the UK with 11
of the top 150 companies whilst France and Germany
are in third and fourth positions with 10 and seven of
the top corporations, respectively.
On a regional basis, 44% of these corporations are
located in just 17 countries of the European Union, 31%
in just two countries of North America (USA and
Canada) and 22% in the 14 countries of the Asia-Pacific
region. This suggests that EU leads in terms of overall
global corporate power, although individually the major
EU economies are small when compared with the
corporate power of the USA.
A more disaggregated view of corporate power can be
obtained by examining individual sectors. The global
food products industry, consisting of agricultural
products and packaged foods, generated revenues of
US$3.2 trillion in 2008 (IMAP, 2010). A small number
of TNCs currently dominate this sector. In terms of
annual turnover, the Swiss Corporation Nestle´ ranks
first in the world with a turnover of over US$112 billion
(Figure 6). Archer-Daniels-Midland (ADM) and
Unilever rank second and third with annual sales of
US$62 billion and US$59 billion respectively. The
annual turnover of the top 11 companies combined is
about US$393 billion. The total asset value of these
TNCs is estimated to be US$439.5 billion. Using this
indicator, Nestle´, Kraft Foods, and Unilever rank first,
second and third respectively (Figure 6).
The ranking is similar for net annual income. With a
profit of about US$37 billion, Nestle´ ranks first,
followed by Kraft Foods (US$5.7 billion) and
Unilever (US$5.69 billion) which rank second and third
respectively. The aggregate annual profit of the top 11
TNCs totals close to US$59 billion.
The global retail industry is currently dominated by
between 10 and 12 TNCs. In 2007, the top 10 retail
TNCs shared 40% of worldwide retail sales (ETC
Group, 2008). According to the FT Global 500 data,
Figure 5: Value of beef exports and main destinations of export destination for major exporters
Figure 6: Annual turnover and asset value of world’s top food products TNCs
Source: FT Global 500
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in 2010, the top 12 retail TNCs collectively had an
annual turnover of US$1.32 trillion. With an annual
turnover of around US$419 billion, the US Corporation
Wal-Mart, by some margin, was the largest. The only
UK retail TNC in this list was Tesco (seventh position).
The asset values of these top 12 TNCs was over US$564
billion in 2010 and Wal-Mart alone represented 32%
(US$180.3 billion) of this. The asset values of the next
three TNCs – Carrefour, Tesco and CVS Caremark –
were around one-third of Wal-Mart (FT Global 500.
This reiterates the economic prowess of Wal-Mart at the
global level.
The economic power of TNCs also manifests itself in
the market for agricultural inputs such as agrochem-
icals, seeds and fertilisers. Like the other sectors, we find
a high degree of concentration with a few TNCs having
substantial market shares (ETC Group, 2008). For
example, in 2007, the top 10 agrochemical companies
controlled 89 per cent of the global market (Figure 7)
with Bayer ranked first in the world, Syngenta second
and BASF ranked third. Of the US$38.6 billion sales in
the world, Bayer and Syngenta shared 19 per cent each
(around US$7.5 billion), and BASF 11 per cent (US$4.3
billion). It is also apparent from Figure 7 that only five
companies – Bayer, Syngenta, BASF, Dow and
Monsanto – account for nearly 70 per cent of the
world’s agrochemical market.
According to the ETC group, in 2007, the global sale
of proprietary seeds was US$22 billion. As shown in
Figure 8, Monsanto was by far the largest company
accounting for just under a quarter of global sales
(about US$5 billion). Together with DuPont (15%) and
Syngenta (9%), these three companies controlled nearly
50 per cent of the world’s proprietary seed market in
2007.
Only seven TNCs currently dominate the fertiliser
market of the world (Figure 9). In terms of net income
in 2007, Potash Corporation ranked first in the world
Figure 7: Annual sales of world’s top agrochemical TNCs (2008)
Source: Agrow World Protection News, 2008
Figure 8: Annual sales of world’s top seed TNCs in 2007
Source: ETC Group, 2008
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(US$1104 million), while Yara (US$1027 million) and
Mosaic (US$944 million) ranked second and third
respectively.
Whilst these figures give an indication of the scale of
the TNCs and market concentration, they clearly do not
tell the whole story in terms of power for a number of
reasons. First, it should be noted that a number of very
large companies are privately owned and therefore their
figures are not publically available. Second, it does not
tell us the number of countries that the companies
operate in, or the number of companies operating within
a particular country. This is clearly important in terms
of the degree of power faced by farmers. Third, as well
as rapidly growing in size through the process of
mergers and takeovers, other forms of business relation-
ship have increased the economic power of TNCs. An
example from the UK is the creation of Frontier
Agriculture as a joint enterprise between Cargill and
ABF focusing on crop inputs and grain marketing. In
effect this increases the economic power of both
companies in the UK.
Political Power
Using the WTO and World Bank as examples, we
illustrate some of the issues surrounding international
political power in the area of agriculture and demon-
strate how closely it is linked to economic power.
Power within the WTO
The WTO’s main purpose is to facilitate the liberal-
isation of global trade (including agri-food trade) by
acting as a ‘platform’ for countries to negotiate trade
problems, settle disputes (e.g. market access, tariff
concessions, and quotas), and formulate and sanction
trade rules. The organisation currently has 153 members
(countries) that cover almost 90% of global trade. In
assessing the power of nation states within the WTO we
have relied on three indicators – financial contribution
to WTO (proxy indicator), capacity to use WTO’s
dispute settlement mechanisms and influence in WTO’s
decision making.
An analysis of the financial contribution of member
states to WTO’s budgets reveals that the WTO relies
heavily on the donations of a few countries – most of
which are the large trading nations that we have shown
in section 3.1. For example, in 2011, only 12 countries,
mostly large economies, collectively contributed over
79% of WTO’s budgets. As shown in Figure 10, the five
largest contributors in order are: EU-159 (38.75%), USA
(12.4%), China (11.18%), Japan (5%) and Canada (3%).
Disregarding the EU as a single entity, the highest
contributors in order are USA, China, Japan, Germany
(8.86%), France (4.49%) and UK (4.84%).
The relationship between economic power and
political power in the WTO can be highlighted in two
areas.
First, a strong relationship exists between the level of
financial contribution and the use of the WTO’s
platform in settling trade disputes. For instance, about
84% (351) of the 419 trade disputes brought into the
WTO from 1995 through to 2010 were made by 12
countries only.10 The remainder of the 141 member
countries together launched slightly over 15% of the
complaints. Whilst the use of the trade dispute platform
is likely to be closely related to the extent of trade, it
does also represent the exercise of power as significant
resources are required in order follow the dispute
process through.
Second, examples provided in the literature indicate
that WTO’s decision making has historically been
dominated by a handful of countries, in particular, the
USA. Although the WTO claims that it operates on a
‘one country one vote’ basis and its decisions are made
based on ‘consensus’ some researchers (e.g. Jamara &
Kwa, 2003; Monbiot, 2004; Steinberg, 2002) argue that
the WTO’s decisions are often made through a process
of informal negotiations between a few large and high-
income member states, for instance, the so called
‘Quad’, comprising USA, EU, Canada and Japan
(Monbiot (2004: 205–207).
However, although, historically, the developed
Western nations, in particular USA, have dominated
9 These 15 countries are UK, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Poland, Norway, Netherlands,
Italy, Ireland, Germany, France, Denmark, Belgium, Austria, and Portugal. Among these 15
nations Germany’s contribution is the highest (8.86%), followed by France (4.49%), and
UK (4.84%). The contribution of other countries range from 3.7% (Italy) to 0.51%
(Portugal).
10 The USA (97) raised the highest number of disputes, followed by EU (82), Canada (33),
Brazil (25), India (19), Argentina (15), Japan (14), South Korea (14), Thailand (13), Chile (10)
and China (8).
Figure 9: Net annual income of world’s top fertilizer TNCs in 2007
Source: ETC Group, 2008
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the WTO, recent incidents indicate a power shift, with
the emerging developing countries also appearing as
powerful players. This power shift manifested itself in
the collapse of the Geneva talks under the Doha
Development Agenda (which began in 2001) due to
disputes between USA, EU, China and India regarding
the liberalisation of agricultural trade. This has been
labelled in the international media as a significant shift
in global power. A German business daily Handelsblatt,
for example, wrote:
‘‘Above all the failure of the WTO talks reflects the
changing power relations in the world. Gone are the
days when the US and Europe could set the tone and
largely draw up the world trade agreements amongst
themselves. China and India took a tough stance. They
fight hard for their interests and only support free trade
when it suits them. The old industrial powers will slowly
realize the bitter truth of this. Geneva was just a
foretaste’’ (Quoted in Spiegel Online International,
2008).
Power within the World Bank
Like the WTO, the World Bank is also a global
institution, represented by 170 member states (World
Bank, 2010). The organisation has historically played
crucial roles in shaping global agriculture through its
lending operations and technical assistance programmes
(see Pincus, 2001). This trend still continues. For
example, in the Fiscal Year 2010, the Bank invested
about US$2.6 billion in agricultural development
programmes, including a Global Agriculture and Food
Security Programme (GAFSP) in order to respond to
the financial needs in developing country agricultural
sectors (World Bank, 2010).
Whilst, the World Bank is represented by 170 member
countries, the voting power of individual countries
within the Bank is unequal and contingent on the
financial contribution made by each member country.
Thus, the country that contributes the most has the
highest voting power. With 16 per cent of the voting
power, the USA currently ranks first, whist the UK
ranks fifth. If we analyse this voting power in terms of
economic coalitions, we see that the G-7 block11 has the
highest voting power (44%), while the BRIC coalition,
comprising of the emerging economies, has only 11% of
the votes.
In terms of global power in agriculture, this distinc-
tion is important because greater voting power enables
countries or coalitions to push forward their own
agenda by influencing the key decisions made by the
Bank, including which countries receive loans and under
what conditions. For example, through its Structural
Adjustment lending programmes the World Bank
persuaded many developing country governments to
slash their budgetary support to agriculture, privatise
state-owned corporations and adopt liberalised policies
in agricultural trade. The Bank used these reforms as
‘pre-conditions’ for sanctioning loans to debt-ridden
developing countries and this condition-based loan-
sanctioning mechanism is still in practice (see Oxfam,
2006). Whilst it is argued that these conditions have a
sound economic rationale, they do enable powerful
countries, like the USA and its agribusiness corpora-
tions, access to developing country markets. Similarly it
has been argued that, since the 1970s, the USA has
systematically used its influence in convincing the Bank
not to grant loans that could facilitate the production of
goods that would compete with US products, i.e. palm
oil, citrus fruits and sugar (Toussaint, 2006).
However, although the World Bank has historically
been dominated by powerful economic coalitions such
11 The G7 member countries are France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, USA, and Canada.
The G7 (which is an informal grouping) is considered to be the most powerful economic
and political coalition in the world. Although it should be noted that with the addition of
Russia it has become known as the G8, and there are reports that France is keen to
expand it further to include other countries such as Brazil, India and China. This again can
be seen to reflect the changing balance of political power in the world.
Figure 10: Share of financial contribution to WTO’s budgets
Source: WTO, 2011
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as the USA and the G-7 group, recently, there has been
a shift in this power game. Although it is still the USA
and the EU countries that have most of the power, the
Bank has recently provided more power to emerging
economies like China and India (World Bank, 2010).
This clearly shows a changing geopolitical landscape
with clear signs of power shift from the West to the East.
As the Chairman of the World Bank Group, Robert
Zoellick himself stated in the 2010 annual report of the
Bank:
‘‘Our shareholders..... fulfilled the commitment....to
increase voting power at the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)12 for
developing and transition countries by at least 3
percentage points, bringing them to 47.19 per cent—a
total shift of 4.59 per cent since 2008. Developing-
country voting power in the International Development
Association (IDA) will rise to more than 45 per cent.
Developing and transition countries’ shares at the
International Finance Corporation (IFC) will increase
by 6.07 per cent to 39.48 per cent. These changes in
voting power help us better reflect the realities of the
new multipolar global economy, where developing and
transition countries are now key players.’’
Political power of TNCs
Evidence from the US highlights the considerable sums
that are spent by the TNCs on lobbying and political
campaign financing. Between 2008 and 2010, for
example, it is estimated that Monsanto alone, one of
the world’s largest seed and agrochemical firms, spent
over US$8.5 million per year in lobbying (Centre for
Responsive Politics, 2011) and only three companies –
Monsanto, Syngenta and Dow – donated over a quarter
million US$ to democrat and republican parties during
the 2009–2010 election cycle (Agri-Pulse, 2010).
Evidently, the TNCs spent these sums in order to
influence public policy processes (Jowit, 2010; Madsen
& Davis, 2011). It is therefore contended that the TNCs
have significant political as well as economic power.
However, it is also evident that civil society organisa-
tions are becoming increasingly adept at using the
political system themselves to counter some of the
power of the large corporations. In 2002, for instance,
farmer organisations lobbied and forced Monsanto to
withdraw its applications for regulatory approval of
GM wheat submitted to the Canadian and US
authorities (Falkner, 2009). Similarly, after eight years
of campaign by Greenpeace in Brazil, Bayer finally
halted trying to introduce GM rice to Brazilian farmers
(Greenpeace International, 2010).
Natural Resources and the Future of Power
This section examines how key natural resources (land,
water, minerals and energy) are distributed globally and
in particular how this distribution maps onto agricul-
tural power.
Land
About three quarters of the world’s 4.8 billion ha of
agricultural land is located within the borders of only 25
countries. According to the FAO (2010), the countries
with the largest shares of global agricultural land are
China (10.7%), Australia (8.5%), USA (8.4%), Brazil
(5.4%) and Russia (4.4%). Collectively, they occupy over
one-third of the world’s agricultural area. However,
simply ranking by area may be misleading as it does not
take into account the population that the land has to
sustain (for example, the situation in China) or the
quality (productive capacity) of the land. Correcting for
population alone, Mongolia has the highest per capita
agricultural area (44 ha/person), followed by Australia
(20 ha/person) and Namibia (18 ha/person). By using
this indicator, some large countries i.e. Russia (32nd),
Brazil (35th), USA (36th) and China (109th) become
much less land rich.
In terms of total arable land, which may be argued to
better reflect productive capacity, the USA ranks first in
the world with an endowment of 170.5 million ha – over
12% of the world’s total (1.4 billion ha). India ranks
second (11.5%), Russia third (8.8%), China fourth
(7.9%) and Brazil fifth (4.4%). However, on a per capita
basis, Australia ranks first in the world with
Kazakhstan and Canada in second and third places,
respectively (Figure 11). Brazil ranks 37th in the world
with per capita arable land of 0.32 ha, India is 106th with
0.13 ha and China 138th with 0.08 ha. Although, some
of the EU countries are within the top 25 in the world in
terms of per capita arable land holding these are not the
agriculturally powerful. On the contrary, powerful
countries like France ranks 41st (0.29 ha) and the UK
ranks 126th (0.09 ha) in the world.
Water
The total renewable water resource (by volume) in the
world is estimated at just over 54 billionm3 per year (FAO
Aquastat). About 67 per cent of this is located in just 15
countries and many of these water-rich countries are
developing economies (Figure 12). The major EU econo-
mies appear to be water poor in comparison to these
developing countries, with the EU-27 only having the
eighth highest water resources globally. The advanced EU
economies may therefore be in a more vulnerable
situation in terms of natural renewable water levels in
comparison to some of the other key agricultural
producers such as the USA, Canada and the BRIC
countries. However, whilst total renewable water
resources provide an indicator of this vulnerability it does
not really take into account the extent that water is
actually acting as a constraining factor on agriculture.
That is while total volumes of water supply are important,
the lack of spare or excess capacity is what actually might
constrain agriculture moving forward.
Minerals
As mentioned earlier, phosphate rock and potassium are
two of the key minerals required by agriculture. In
addition, they are non-renewable and currently there are
no suitable substitutes available. Therefore, they pro-
vide useful examples of how control over production
may provide power in agriculture.12 IBRD, IDA, and IFC are collectively called the ‘The World Bank Group’.
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Almost the entire reserve of world’s phosphate rock,
which is estimated to be 65 billion tonnes, is located in
just 15 countries (USGS, 2011). Nearly 77 per cent of
this reserve is in Morocco and Western Sahara (M&WS)
and over 98 per cent is in just nine countries (Figure 13).
A number of the countries with considerable phos-
phate rock reserves are important players in agriculture,
such as USA, Canada and three of the BRICS countries.
In contrast, none of the EU countries have any
phosphate rock reserves, potentially making them
vulnerable vis-a`-vis the emerging BRICS countries.
In terms of production, China currently ranks first in
the world with an average annual production of about
63 million tonnes (Figure 12). In second and third
positions are the USA (26.3 million tonnes) and M&WS
(24.5 million tonnes).
Looking forward, at the current rate of production
and with known reserves, phosphate reserves are
forecast to last for a further 400 years. However, with
the exception of M&WS, the phosphate rock reserves of
a number of currently important producers are going to
be depleted in the much nearer future. For example,
Canada’s reserve is going to be exhausted in just seven
years, Australia’s in 29 years13 and China’s in about 60
years. Although the current reserves in the M&WS
region are more secure into the future, this region is
likely to be the focus of a power struggle between the
major world economies in future.
The current global Potassium reserve is estimated to
be around 9.5 billion tonnes. Almost 100% of this
reserve is located in just 13 countries, while over 81% in
just two countries – Canada and Russia (Figure 15).
Germany is the only country within the EU with any
considerable Potassium reserves.
In 2009/10, the average production of Potassium in
the world was about 27 million tonnes per year. Canada
is currently the largest producer and, in 2010, accounted
for over 28% of the world’s production (Figure 16). The
other major producers were Russia (20%), Belarus
(15%), China (9%) and Germany (9%). These five
countries currently produce over 80% of the world’s
Potassium. The UK is the second highest potassium
producer within the EU, Germany being the first.
However, the amount shared by the UK is only about
1.2% and Germany and the UK together produce
slightly over 10% of the world’s Potassium.
Looking forward, given the current reserves and the
current rate of production, it is estimated that potas-
sium reserves will be depleted in just under 300 year’s
time. However, six of the above 13 countries are going
to deplete their Potassium reserves in between just 19
and 70 years. These include Israel, followed by Jordan,
Spain, UK, Germany and China. The immediate
depletion of the Potassium reserves in countries such
13 Although Australia is a phosphate rock producer, the country’s reserve is only 82 million
tonnes, which is 0.13% of the world. This is why Australia is not shown in Figure 4.4 as
having phosphate rock.
Figure 11: World’s top 25 countries according to per capita arable land holding in hectares vis-a-vis UK
Source: FAO, 2010
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as the UK, Germany and China may place them in a
vulnerable position vis-a`-vis the other top agricultural
producers in the world – such as Brazil, Russia, Canada
and the USA.
Energy
The final resource considered is energy. Whilst agricul-
ture is estimated to account for less than two per cent of
total energy demand in the world, it is essential to
modern agriculture. Therefore access to energy is as
important to future agricultural production as it is to
the rest of the economy.
Over 90% of the world’s crude oil reserves are located
in a handful of countries, most of which are in the
Middle East and North Africa, North America (Canada
and USA) and Latin America (Venezuela, Algeria, and
Brazil) (CIA, 2010). The only country in Europe with a
Figure 12: Top 15 water rich countries vis-a-vis EU-27
Source: FAO AquaStat
Figure 13: World’s phosphate rock reserves
Source: USGS, 2011
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significant reserve of crude oil is Russia (74.2 billion
barrels). Very few of the EU countries that currently
dominate the world in terms of agricultural production
and trade have any significant oil reserve.
In terms of crude oil production, a similar picture
emerges. Over 85% of the world’s crude oil is currently
produced by only 25 countries only (CIA, 2010). Among
these countries, Russia currently ranks first, while Saudi
Arabia and USA rank second and third, respectively. It is
noteworthy that, only about a third of the current global
‘oil giants’ are the global ‘food giants’. This means that
two-thirds of the existing global food giants have to rely
to a large extent on a steady supply of oil from the non-
agricultural countries. Other things being equal, this
situation suggests a degree of vulnerability. This vulner-
ability becomes even clearer, particularly for EU coun-
tries, if we take into account the high level of oil
consumption in these countries (CIA, 2010). For example,
our estimates suggest that at the current rate of
consumption, domestic reserves can sustain most
European countries for between just 24 and 359 days,
with the exception of UK, Norway and Denmark. If there
is an oil crisis, the energy-intensive agricultural sectors of
these countries would clearly be adversely affected.
Figure 15: Global potassium reserves
Source: USGS, 2011
Figure 14: Annual Phosphate rock production (2009–2010)
Source: USGS, 2011
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The current world reserve of natural gas is 188 trillion
m3. Like oil, almost all (. 94%) of this reserve is located
in just 25 countries (CIA, 2010). Russia ranks first with
a reserve of 47.6 trillion (25.30% of the world), followed
by Iran (15.75%) and Qatar (13.55%). These three
countries share more than one-half (55%) of the world’s
natural gas reserves. The natural gas reserve is minimal
in European countries, except Norway and the
Netherlands that collectively share 2% of the world’s
reserves. It is also noteworthy that very few of the
world’s other agriculturally important countries have
substantial natural gas reserves (CIA, 2010).
4. Discussion and Conclusions
This paper has considered the issue of power in world
agriculture – economic, political and natural resources.
This section briefly discusses their implications, and
introduces the ‘Power Index’ as a way to draw together
the results of the study.
The analysis of the economic power of nation states in
the world indicates that, at present, the power is
concentrated in North America and Europe. However,
certain countries such as Brazil and New Zealand are
currently the largest exporters of some commodities
(e.g. beef and dairy products) in the world. There is little
evidence to suggest that this current power situation is
likely to change markedly in the next 10 years. However,
it is also apparent that the EU as a whole has retreated
from world markets as policies have changed and that
the export capabilities of the EU-27 in some key
commodity sectors are predicted to decline further in
the next 10 years, unless policy measures change
markedly. This change may be seen as indicating a
decline in the power of the EU-27 within the global
context. However, given that a significant proportion of
the exports were subsidy driven, the move to a more
market orientated situation may in fact improve its
competitive position in the longer term. In addition, in
the short run, being less reliant on export subsidies will
also strengthen the EUs position in trade negotiations.
Our analysis also indicates that, although the emer-
ging economies, in particular, China and Brazil, have
clear advantages in certain commodity markets, their
corporate power in agriculture is still not on a par
with that of North American (US and Canada) and
European countries, especially, UK, France and
Germany. These major North American and EU
economies therefore are in a strong position to
consolidate their economic power through their trans-
national agribusiness corporations. However, a major
challenge for them is to balance corporate power with
consumer and farmer power domestically, whilst main-
taining global power.
The available evidence supports the view that the
political power relevant to global agriculture is still
concentrated in the hands of the USA, major EU
countries and some other economically powerful coun-
tries within the G-8 coalition. However, recently there
have been indications that this situation is changing and
some emerging economies in the developing world are
increasingly powerful players on the world stage. This
has important implications for European and UK
agriculture, in particular, in terms of transnational
agricultural trades. In the coming decades, EU countries
may have to confront increased pressure to allow
greater access to their markets. This pressure is likely
to come from emerging economies – like China, India
and Brazil and will have implications for domestic
producers.
Our analysis also confirms the influence of transna-
tional corporations (TNCs) in global agriculture.
Although, their power is not limitless and, it can be
argued that ultimately it is nation states who can control
agriculture, for example as shown in 2008 when a
number of countries implemented export bans to try to
ameliorate the impacts of a food crisis. There is also
evidence that in some cases civil society organisations
and farmer groups have had a significant impact in
countervailing or balancing corporate influences. These
findings do not corroborate the suggestions made by
Figure 16: Annual Potassium production (2009–2010)
Source: USGS, 2011
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some that, in this age of corporate globalisation, the
state is powerless to resist corporate activities.
In terms of control over natural resources, our
analysis shows a potentially grim picture for many of
the currently powerful agricultural countries, including
USA and Europe. In particular, European countries,
including the United Kingdom, appear to be relatively
poorly endowed in global terms with the critical natural
resources used in agriculture – such as land, water,
potassium, phosphate, oil and natural gas. This situa-
tion, especially the availability of water and energy, is
likely to become worse because of the impacts of climate
change. Although many of the emerging economies, like
Brazil, China and Russia are better-placed in terms of
water and energy endowments, some of these countries
appear to be vulnerable in terms of their possession of
agricultural land (more specifically, arable land) and
critical minerals relative to their population size. This
partly explains the much reported phenomenon of ‘land-
grabbing’ in Africa, in which some major EU countries
have also taken part (Friis & Reenberg, 2010).
Three key implications can be drawn from these
findings for agriculture worldwide:
N There will be increased competition for available land
and resources which is likely to result in significant
upward shifts in the prices of these resources.
N In the shorter term, further improvements in resource
use efficiency (water, fertiliser and energy) are needed
to sustain current levels of production.
N As traditional resources become scarcer, alternative
practices will need to be developed and adopted.
Finally, Table 2 attempts to pull together the various
dimensions of power that have been discussed into a
power index. The index is simply constructed by ranking
each country/region on a scale of 1 to 5 for the
individual components of power discussed within this
report. For example, agricultural trade comprises an
average of the ranking for the role in exports and
imports (treated equally), whilst natural is an average of
the score for land availability (both total and arable),
population and water14. It is of course an imprecise
science but the findings support the general conclusions
of the previous chapters.
As might be expected the US and the EU top the
power index by some margin. However, the index does
highlight their potential vulnerability in terms of natural
resources (key agricultural minerals and oil) moving
forward. On the other hand the emerging countries at
the moment have lower political and corporate power
but seem better placed in terms of natural and mineral
resources.
One aspect of the index that requires further
clarification is the relationship between corporate power
and the power index. Our approach has been predicated
on the assumption that those countries/regions with a
predominance of TNCs are more powerful. Implicitly
this suggests that they confer power on a country.
Whilst this is our view we accept that there are other
ways of viewing this relationship. For example whilst
TNCs may well locate in countries with economic and
political power they are not necessarily the determinants
of that power. In addition, it could be argued that due
to their size and power, a predominance of TNCs may
in fact be a challenge to the power of the state and this
may not always be to the advantage of the agricultural
sector.
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Table 2: Global Power Index for Agriculture
Dimension EU27 US Brazil Russia China Australasia Japan
Trade 4.5 5.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.5
Corporate 5.0 5.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 3.0
Political 5.0 5.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 4.0
Natural 3.5 4.0 3.3 3.5 4.5 3.3 1.5
Minerals 1.3 2.5 2.3 4.3 3.3 1.0 0.0
Total 19.3 21.5 9.5 14.8 14.8 9.8 11.0
14 The power index was constructed by combining all the information in the report. For
each power dimension the individual power components (e.g. imports and exports for
‘Trade’ or water, total land, arable land and population for ‘Natural’) were scored on a
scale of 0 to 5 for each country / region. The score was allocated by the research team
after consideration of the evidence, where 5 meant considerable power and zero meant
effectively no power. These individual components of the power dimension were then
averaged to populate the table.
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